Vital Interests: Your work focuses on the Middle East, particularly Syria. The Syrian war has been going on for almost 10 years now with over half a million people killed, millions more displaced, and widespread destruction. Can you give us an overview of how this conflict developed, who the warring parties are, and what the current status is?

Joshua Landis: The Syrian uprising and resulting civil war are really part of the Arab Spring uprising. It started in Tunisia in 2011 and when the unrest hit Syria the country burst into flames. Syrians were living under a very oppressive dictatorial regime that had been in power for 50 years. The Assad regime was intolerant of any level of protest. 

Crucial to understanding the duration and bloodiness of the Syrian conflict, is the ethnic and sectarian religious divisions within Syria - that really added oil to the flames. Unfortunately, Syrians didn't trust each other. They didn't feel like one political community and we saw the deep divisions throughout the Middle East over lines of class and particularly Islamists versus secularists. In Syria, the Alawite community is a religious minority that is 12% of the population. The president, Bashar al-Assad, is an Alawite and his father had ruled since 1970. When this uprising broke out in 2011, the Alawites collectively rallied around the regime, because the Assads had packed the upper ranks - the security state, the intelligence service, the military - with Alawite officers in order to coup-proof the regime, in order to make sure that the Assads would stay in power.

That created, really, a bulwark against any possible changes, and so it was almost inevitable that the uprising became extremely violent because the military did not defect as it did in other countries. It didn't turn away from the president and try to change him. Instead, it fought tooth and nail to preserve the power of the Alawites and the regime. Then the West jumped in and the Gulf states jumped in.They poured in billions of dollars worth of arms and then the Russians jumped in, the Iranians jumped in on the side of the Assad regime and this internationalization and development of proxy militias expanded the war tremendously and made sure it went on for the decade that it has gone on.

Syria was exhausted a long time ago and things might have wound down years ago, had there not been so much foreign assistance. That foreign assistance has really kept the fuel on the flames.

VI: The foreign assistance, this kind of proxy war that's going on in Syria now, what do these proxies hope to get? There's Turkey, there's Russia, there's Iran, there's the United States, there's France, the Saudis, and Qatar. Do they all have their own agendas or are there alliances among these proxies to divide up the spoils after this is all over?

Joshua Landis: There were alliances. Those alliances have largely fallen apart as it became clear that this was a losing battle. In the beginning, in 2011, almost everybody thought that Assad would fall easily, that the regime would collapse, that it was on its last legs. They all put their shoulder to the wheel in what was called “The Friends of Syria.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton organized this and there were over 110 countries who participated in this Friends of Syria and gave aid and help to the opposition, but that coalition quickly began to fall apart.

It fell apart for a number of important reasons. One, most important in my view, was that the Syrian opposition was extremely divided. It could never come together around either a liberal leadership, which is what the Western countries were counting on, or a Muslim Brotherhood/Islamist coalition which Turkey and Qatar and others wanted, or even a pro-Saudi coalition, which is what the Saudis and some others wanted. Those divergences began to really divide this Friends of Syria coalition. It was really driven by the fact that the Syrian people themselves were extremely divided about what they wanted, what kind of future they wanted.

Did they want democracy? Did they want an Islamic state, a caliphate, an emirate? All kinds of different proposals were on the boards and we really have no clue what percentage of Syrians wanted which option. Many Syrians, of course, began to side with the regime itself. Even if not wholeheartedly because I think almost everybody in Syria wanted reform and change. They saw that the system was corrupt, it was tyrannical. Once the fighting started, many Syrians, particularly religious minorities, were terrified that an Islamist government would replace the Assad government and drive them to the margins of society, if not out of it altogether, through ethnic cleansing.

The religious minorities and more secular Sunnis began to support the regime even if begrudgingly. That led to really the worst of all worlds, which is that the Islamic extremists rose to the top of the rebel cause. They had the best and most determined fighters. Poorer and more rural Syrians understood Islam. They are not well versed in liberalism and have not experienced democracy.  Groups like al-Qaeda or Nusra, as al-Qaida’s branch in Syria was called, as well as ISIS, which emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq, quickly became dominant. By 2013, I think it is fair to say that the opposition had evolved into an al-Qaeda tinged Islamist soup. Al-Qaeda and by 2014, ISIS, dominated the field of some 2,000 militias. They could exact tribute, control the main border crossings, and intimidate smaller militias.

Ultimately the United States became spooked by the opposition it was helping to arm, train and champion. Once Washington understood that if the Syrian Army was overrun by rebel forces, ISIS and al-Qaeda were likely to rule.

The possibility that the US would be blamed for Salafi-Jihadists taking over Damascus became a real concern for Obama. This is why the US stopped arming the Arab Syrian opposition and its goal of bringing down Assad. Instead it turned its guns against ISIS. The only Syrian opposition group that embraced this new U.S. objective was the Syrian Kurds, led by the People’s Protection Units or YPG. This is how the U.S. went from backing Syria’s rebel Arabs to backing its Kurdish rebels. 

That led to even further divisions that we see in Syria today.

VI: The Muslim radical groups, these were Sunni? What percentage of the Syrian population was Sunni when this war began? Was it the religious majority? 

Joshua Landis: Yes it was. About 80% of the Syrian population are Sunni Muslims. Now, 70% are Sunni Muslim Arabs and 10% are Kurdish. The Kurds and Arabs didn't get along well because they have contradictory national objectives. The Kurds were demanding that Arabs recognize their “national rights.” The Arab rebels rejected Kurdish aspirations for a high degree of autonomy, if not independence. The Kurds called their region in North-East Syria, Rojava, which means the western part of Kurdistan. Many Arabs fear that the Kurds ultimately want independence. What is more, Turkey demanded that the Arab militias not to cooperate with the YPG. Ankara insists that the UPG is part of the PKK, the Kurdish organization in Turkey that Ankara and the U.S. blame for 40,000 deaths and have designated as a terrorist organization. 

Another reason the Jihadist forces within the Syrian opposition became paramount is that they had the biggest backbench. They could call on support from seasoned fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as mobilize foreign fighters from around the world. Young Muslims flocked to Syria to participate in the Jihad against the unbeliever tyrant.

Many Syrian opposition supporters blame the West for the success of the Jihadists. They argue that had the West destroyed the Syrian Army early on in the uprising, liberal Syrians would have taken control and stopped the rise of the jihadists. I am not convinced by this argument. Western statesmen and women have repeatedly over-estimated the number and power of Middle Eastern liberals. From Afghanistan to Libya, western intervention has not enabled liberal opposition groups, but the opposite. 

VI: The Assad regime, the Alawites, are they considered Sunni as well or are they a distinct religious minority?

Joshua Landis: They are a heterodox Shi'ite offshoot from the 9th century. Now, what does that mean? In the simplest terms you could think of them in an American context, and this does some injustice, but you can think of them as the Mormons of Syria because they add a Book and they add a prophet. They deify Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed. This puts them beyond the pale of Islam for most Sunni Muslims. 

They are not accepted as Muslim by Syria’s Sunni theologians. In fact, neither do Twelver-Shi’a theologians. The Muslim Brotherhood in the '60s and '70s tried to throw them out. Many of their top ideologues called them various epithets like “Majus” or Maji meaning that they are covert Persians, who accepted Islam only nominally, in order to subvert or destroy it. 

There's a lot of prejudice and misunderstanding regarding the Alawites. Alawites have tended to live enclosed in their Western mountains along the Mediterranean coast of Syria. Under the Ottomans, they were badly discriminated against and were not allowed to testify in court because they weren't seen as People of the Book. The demographic segregation between Alawites and Sunnis was dramatic until WWII. When the French conquered Syria in 1920, Alawites and Sunni Arabs lived together in no town. Christians and Alawites shared villages, but not Sunnis and Alawites. 

The Alawites have been called a “closed community” that suffers from a “minority complex.” Only in the last 50 years have they descended from their mountain villages into the cities and integrated in Syrian society. But it has not always been easy. Demographic and social segregation remains important.

VI: Another confusing element within Syria is the Ba'athist party. Was that also an outgrowth of an Alawite movement or are the Ba'athist something different in themselves?

Joshua Landis: The Ba'ath was a Pan-Arab nationalist movement that spread throughout the Middle East. It was particularly strong in Syria and Iraq, where Ba'ath parties came to power. In Syria, religious minorities in particular embraced the Baath Party. Many Alawites became Ba'athists, but so did Druze, Ismailis, and Christians. Rural Syrian Sunnis also joined the Baath because it advocated socialism and greater  social equity. They could unite around Arabism, their common ethnic bond. Arabism was used to overcome the deep religious divisions that had bedeviled Syria. The Ba’ath Party hoped it could bury Syrians’ religious differences beneath their common ethnic national identity.

The Alawites, the Assad family, in particular, embraced this Ba'athism and used it to consolidate their rule after taking power in a series of coups in the 1960s. Arabism doesn't really capture the imagination of Syrians today. Islamism has been successful in presenting Syrians an alternative to secular Arabism, which the Ba’ath Party has discredited in the eyes of many.

VI: Within the Assad regime that operates out of Damascus, who are the people who are in control? How large is the population that supports the regime in the territories that they control in or around Damascus and in western Syria?

Joshua Landis: That's a very difficult thing to answer because most people who support the regime support it passively. They don't love it. In fact, they see it as corrupt and so forth, but as the least bad option, so it's very hard to count who are regime supporters. In an authoritarian regime like Syria's, a lot of people are just cowed. They don't see an alternative and they put their heads down and try not to be political in any way. Whenever I saw attempts during the civil war by various intelligence agencies or different polling agencies to gauge support in Syria for the opposition, the results were inconclusive. It is difficult to get an accurate profile of realities in Syria.

I was occasionally sent these polls to try to see if I could make some sense out of them, and in almost every case fewer people believed that specific opposition groups were going to be good for Syria, but there was never a majority of Syrians that supported the regime. When asked if you liked the regime or if you support the regime, the numbers would get smaller and smaller. It was only when asked in negative terms that the regime got higher numbers. That makes it very difficult to gauge Syrian loyalties. 

Another complicating factor is that Syrians often changed their loyalties. One example of how groups changed their loyalties over the course of the war is the Kurds who make up some 10% of the Syrian population. Most Syrian Kurds wanted change; many wanted hoped for quasi-independence. 

But when the Turkish military crossed the border to attack the YPG and the Kurdish region or when Islamist Arab forces, such as ISIS attacked the Kurds, both of which happened, the Kurds gravitated away from the opposition and toward the regime. The Kurds tend to be more secular but most importantly, they are a minority in Syria and thus have a common fear of the Sunni Arab majority that they share with Syria’s religious minorities. The Assad regime has pursued what might be called a minority strategy. This strategy creates a natural affinity for the Kurds. Even though the regime is Arab nationalist and refuses to accord the Kurds autonomy, it shares with the YPG a common fear of the Sunni jihadists.The regime has been able to align itself with many subgroups, religious, tribal and ethnic. The regime’s alliances have not been consistent. Many are opportunistic and fleeting. So too have been the alliances of the opposition. 

Syria’s minorities make up around 30% of the population. Most have supported the regime. Many Sunni Arabs, particularly the more secular-minded ones, have supported the regime, even if reluctantly and intermittently. Many came to view the opposition as dysfunctional because it was so fragmented. They feared chaos and the lack of a central authority. Some saw the opposition militias as no less violent and authoritarian as the regime. Older and richer Syrians feared losing their possessions to young fighters should the militants take over or overran their neighborhood. Older people aren't so revolutionary. The regime had a lot of passive support from different sectors of the Syrian population, particularly after the uprising became violent. 

VI: The regime is also the military and for many years the military fought all these different factions that were fighting among each other. As you said, because of the duration of the war, Assad had his back up against the wall and militarily he was really depleted. But then Assad got support from external forces - Hezbollah fighters came in backed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and then lately it's Russian support, if not with troops certainly airpower. How does that all play out?

Joshua Landis: You're absolutely right. The Syrian struggle turned into a regional war and internationalized quickly. Ultimately, the Assad regime and the government in Syria had much better friends than the rebels did, in Russia and Iran and Hezbollah. They were committed not to let the Assad regime collapse because, had it collapsed, their security situation would have deteriorated badly. We have to remember that this was really a Pan-Islamic struggle in many respects. As the rebels called for foreign fighters to come to Syria, and we believe that some 50,000 to 60,000 Sunni foreign fighters traveled to Syria, the Shi'ites, of which the Alawites are a sort of heterodox subset, did the same thing. They called on fellow Shi'ites to rally around the flag. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and even some from Afghanis mobilized by Iran, came streaming into Syria. 

We have to remember that the Northern Arab world, the Levant countries of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, are home to more Shi'ite Arabs than Sunnis. Even though Syria has a large Sunni Arab majority, Iraq is 60% Shi'a. The Shi’a of Lebanon, Iraq and Iran answered the call of Damascus and helped counter-balance the Sunni fighters who streamed into Syria to help the rebels from around the larger Sunni Islamic world.

Syria’s war became this larger regional war. Ultimately the Shi'ite mobilization with Russian help was able to preserve the Assad regime. The Shiite dominance stretching from Lebanon to Iran has been called the Shi'ite Crescent. Shiite supremacy is an important part of the new security architecture in the Northern Middle East. Russia jumped in and decided that by siding with the Shi'ites it could reassert its interests in the region. This is because America had, especially under Trump, sided firmly with the Sunni powers of Saudia Arabia and the Gulf states. The U.S. doubled down against Iran and against the Shi'ites, writ large. 

Iran and Hezbollah were terrified that if the Saudis and Americans were able to bring down the Assad regime, the Shiites would be marginalized in the Middle East. They feared that Israel and Saudi Arabia with the help of the U.S. would be able to pick them off one at a time. That fear was key to Assad’s being able to hang on and survive. It allowed him to get the military and economic support he needed. The Arab World has been a Sunni dominated world for centuries. Shiites have been poor and marginalized. By empowering Arab Shiites and helping them to power, Iran has been able to assert itself regionally. This Shiite awakening has upset the Sunni world. Many see it as a violation of the natural order in Arab World, a threat to Islam itself. 

VI: In the midst of all this, with all kinds of fighters streaming into Syria, there is the rise of ISIS, a very sectarian Sunni group intent on seizing territory in Syria and Iraq to establish a caliphate. Did that create a new side war within Syria that caused many to drop what they were doing and turn their attention to this new and dangerous threat of an Islamic State?

Joshua Landis: That certainly was America's attitude and caused it to turn away from the fight against Assad and take up the fight against ISIS. Unfortunately, many in the U.S. viewed ISIS as a pawn that could be used against Assad, at least until the Russians entered Syria in 2015. The United States stood with its hands in its pockets for most of 2014 while ISIS grew in strength, conquered a third of Syria, and moved south, taking Palmyra and some suburbs of Damascus itself. We have an extraordinary recording that was made by a Syrian opposition member at a conference in which a bunch of opposition people were talking with Secretary of State Kerry. The meeting took place at the Dutch Mission to the United Nations on Sept 22, 2016. 

Kerry explained to the Syrian opposition members that Washington had hoped that the pressure from ISIS would force Assad to negotiate with the U.S. and allow the opposition to share in power. Kerry said:

The reason Russia came in is because ISIS was getting stronger. “[The Islamic State] was threatening the possibility of going to Damascus and so forth. We were watching. We saw that [the Islamic State] was growing in strength, and we thought Assad was threatened. We thought, however, we could probably manage. You know, that Assad might then negotiate. Instead of negotiating he got Putin to support him.

In essence, Kerry throws his hands up and informs the Syrian activists that the United States cannot continue to support the Sunni Arab rebels if they do not rally against ISIS. The Sunni militias refused to do it. America tried to train Sunni militiamen in Turkey and to get them motivated to fight ISIS. But by and large, the Sunni fighters did not sign up for the new fight. They were determined to continue the fight against Assad. That really turned America against the rebels and forced America to side with the Kurds in Northern Syria, who were willing to fight ISIS. The U.S. rallied the Middle East around the anti-ISIS fight. It was difficult at first because countries like Turkey and groups like Syria’s rebel militias did not want to fight ISIS. They were focused on taking down Assad.

The United States was frightened that if ISIS succeeded in defeating Assad, it would take Damascus. Al-Qaeda too might expand its territory. That meant that for a while, America cooperated with Russia and allowed Russia a freehand in Syria. That is what Putin counted on. Putin, I think, waited until September 2015 before stepping in, not only because that is when Assad formally asked for his assistance, but also because he understood that the U.S. would not escalate against Russia for fear of ISIS. America, he hoped, might actually welcome him. America’s policy had exploded in its hands. It had led to the expansion of ISIS. Thus Putin believed that Russia could jump in and support Assad with little risk that Washington would oppose him. He was right. Kerry worked closely with Lavrov and tried to find common ground in Syria with Russia.

VI:  ISIS was not only moving on Damascus, they were also moving on Baghdad. The United States was seeing Iraq go down the tubes. Mosul and large sections of Iraq were in ISIS hands.

Joshua Landis: Absolutely. ISIS took over the Sunni-tribal parts of Syria and Iraq with almost no shots fired. This is because the Sunni world that stretched between Baghdad and Aleppo was exhausted. It was also terrified that the Shi'ites were going to marginalize them. The whole region had become so sectarianized or so fearful and brutalized, that many Sunnis were able to view ISIS as a savior. Or, at least, as a better option than their local governments. The Iraqis saw ISIS as a better option than Baghdad, which was run by Shi'ites. Many of the Syrian tribal groups saw ISIS in a similar way. They believed it would be better than Damascus. That's what led to the Ismalic State’s extraordinarily rapid rise. The region had become extremely sectarian. Many Sunnis were willing to accept ISIS despite its extreme bigotry and religious radicalism.

VI: Putin has played a skillful chess game in Syria. He's making all the final moves which have marginalized the United States. Certainly, the end game now going on in Northern Syria between Turkey and Russia, over control of Idlib, seems to be also playing out in Russia's favor.

Joshua Landis: It does. In some ways, this underlines the failure of America's democracy campaign or democracy promotion effort in the larger Middle East because, as we recall, George W Bush, when he occupied Baghdad, in 2003, he said, "We're going to democratize the greater Middle East and bring democracy. Baghdad will be the linchpin, and then there will be dominoes falling after that." Putin turned around and challenged this American theory about the fourth wave of democracy spreading through the Middle East and said, "You're crazy. You're going to turn this place into chaos, and there are going to be Islamist militias running around. What the Middle East needs is not democracy, it needs strong men. Just the way Russia needs a strong man."

In a sense, you had a clash of ideologies as well as of territorial power. Russia presented the notion that regions of the world are not ready for democracy. They need strong men and authoritarian rule. America said, "No, that's not true. We've passed that phase and we're into the end of history." That clash of those two ideas really has played out in Syria and in a sense, Putin won.

VI: Talking about winnings, here we are 10 years almost into this war. There have been various attempts at peace conferences. There was one much touted last fall in Geneva, and representatives from the opposition groups and civil society and the regime and various governments got together. Talks went on, talks ended, and then that was that. What is going on? Are there any negotiations or is everything still just waiting to see how the power politics play out in Northern Syria with Turkey and Russia and Iran, of course under the maximum pressure campaign by the United States? What is the situation at the moment?

Joshua Landis: Well, the situation is really that the peace talks are going nowhere. Assad feels that he has won, and he has won. He is taking back territory in the Idlib province which is dominated by this child of Al-Qaeda. It's called Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham or the Committee for the Liberation of Syria, but it's been renamed a few times. It started out as Al-Qaeda in Syria, Nusra. They're the dominant power. Oddly enough, America and Turkey are left defending Al-Qaeda dregs in Syria against the Assad regime which is a very embarrassing situation.

The cover under which they're doing it is that Idlib has 3 million people there, tons of refugees have been pushed up into this region. It is a humanitarian disaster and America's focused on the humanitarian issue saying, "No, you shouldn't destroy Al-Qaeda in Idlib, the Syrian regime shouldn't do it, because it'll cause this humanitarian disaster," which it is causing. Assad would probably wish that in taking back Idlib, most of these people would flee into Turkey and be Turkey's problem. There are close to 100,000 fighters - we see different estimations-  but of these last rebel groups who are the most hard-bitten and Assad would love to get rid of them and make them Turkey's problem, saying, "You armed them, you trained them, you did this. The West can have them." They're yours. 

Assad of course doesn't want them back in Syrian society and that's the real trouble here - that we've gotten to this bitter end and there is this sector of Syria that has become a fishbowl for all kinds of different rebel types. Assad would like to destroy them, the West doesn't want them, and Turkey is seeking to contain them in a sort of buffer zone along the Turkish border. It's a very uncomfortable situation and it's back and forth. It looks like Assad is going to win because legally, it's his land, he's still the recognized government of Syria by the UN and there's no other legal pretext for creating an independent government. Certainly not one that's ruled by an Al-Qaeda affiliate.

VI: In the end, what is Syria going to look like? Is it going to be the Assad regime primarily in control of a partitioned country with the Kurds and perhaps some other minorities governing parts of Syria? Is there going to be a Rojava state reconstituted in Kurdish territory?

Joshua Landis: I think that Assad is going to slowly take back the remaining regions of Syria, both the Rojava area, which is defended by 600 American troops, and air power, which is key. Once that air power withdraws, the Kurds aren't going to have a leg to stand on because they don't have an international defender. Turkey wants them destroyed; it does not want an independent Kurdish state on its border. Syria doesn't either. Neither does Iraq. Neither does Iran and neither does Russia.

Russia would put up with it if the Syrian regime could abide by it but ultimately, the international community is not going to support an independent Kurdish state in Northern Syria. They would love to see some kind of autonomy but who's going to protect that autonomy? America is doing it today, but will not do it in the long run. Something like the coronavirus pandemic is just, I think, drawing a line between 9/11 and that whole war on terror and our focus on Iran and the Middle East. I think we're going to see after this, that it's time to refocus our notions of national security.

This means that Assad is going to take back these areas slowly but surely. It will take a long time because he's weak and because a lot of foreign powers are still supporting different groups, Turkey is supporting Tahrir al-Sham and America is supporting the Kurds, but they'll get tired of that and Assad will come back. That leaves a Syria that is on its knees. The Syrian national budget, last year, was $9 billion. It had been 50 and it's nothing. They've spent $1 billion on reconstruction and it's estimated, by the UN, that it's going to take $300 to $400 billion to rebuild Syria.

Today, there's been the Lebanese banking crisis, and most Syrians squirreled away their money in Lebanon dollar accounts where they got high-interest rates. All of that's been lost and we've seen deep inflation in Syria. It's under terrifying sanctions that are making it extremely difficult to do anything. I can't send money to relatives, my wife's relatives or to friends that I've been trying to do. I can't. There's no way to get money into Syria. You have to get somebody to carry it in and it's very complicated. Businesses are at a standstill, and Syria is a broken-down country and it's likely to remain that way for some time.

VI: Will Russia and Iran have to commit to rebuilding and just have Syria as a client state?

Joshua Landis: Yes and rebuild slowly. Assad is trying to balance these different powers. He's trying to appeal to the Gulf countries- for example, the United Arab Emirates has reopened its embassy. Other groups are making similar noises. Iraq has done the same. China is helping to a very limited degree. Russia and Iran are the biggest investors, but they are becoming the dominant investors. It's very difficult for private Syrians to invest and for Lebanese companies and regional companies to work with them because America has secondary sanctions on anybody who tries to help Syria. It will come back but it'll be a slow process and a squirrely one, because of all the restrictions on it and because the regime is extremely corrupt. It's crony capitalism at its most flourishing.

VI: I suppose the Assad regime will not anxiously welcome back millions of refugees that left and are in desperate circumstances with nowhere else to go but back to Syria?

Joshua Landis: It's very worried about them and so it vets them and they all have to do their military service. No young man who's been out of the country wants to come back because they don't want to do military service. They can be held for years and who knows what they're going to have to do? They're very vulnerable. There's no job so people don't want to go back. There's a security issue which you don't know. I've been working with a bunch of European UN people in Europe who are trying to come up with a rubric for how do you give asylum if somebody has to go back and do military service?

Should they be able to get asylum in Europe if they haven't done their military service and they did some tangential work with the opposition? Can they still go home? We don't know the answer to that because it depends on which security officer interviews you. When you go back, you have an interview with a security person and if they see that you're related to family members who were in the opposition or something, they could throw you into jail, you don't know, or get tortured. You just don't know -  it's a very arbitrary process and lots of insecurity.

VI: Certainly there'll be no international organization like the UN that is going to provide oversight of this process?

Joshua Landis: There isn't. There isn't any real outside oversight and that's, I think, a shortcoming of the Western policy which is still designed with sanctions to bring about regime change in Syria. The West has not given up its dream of overturning the Assad regime and therefore it refuses to use the leverage it does have with sanctions to negotiate a better situation for refugee return, and particularly, for prisoners who are in Syrian jails. I think if America and the West focused uniquely on trying to get a better deal, for prisoners and returnees, it might get a lot in Syria.

I think Assad would trade a lot in order to loosen up the economy, but he can't leave. He's not going to leave power.

VI: Joshua so we're coming to the end of our time. This has been a good discussion - we've covered a lot of ground. I think our readers will certainly understand more about all the dynamics and complexities that have to do with Syria. I know the future looks pretty grim but maybe there'll be some hope for the Syrian people.

Joshua Landis: Well, thank you. It's a great conversation. Good questions. I enjoyed it a lot.

Joshua Landis is Sandra Mackey Chair and Professor of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma in the College of International Studies. He is also Director of the Center for Middle East Studies. He writes and manages “SyriaComment.com,” a daily newsletter on Syrian politics that attracts some 50,000 page-reads a month. Dr. Landis publishes frequently in policy journals such as Foreign Affairs, Middle East Policy and Foreign Policy. His book: Syria at Independence, Nationalism, The Fight for Leadership, and Failure of Republicanism will be published by the Arab Center for research and Policy studies this coming year.