Vital Interests:  Omar, thanks for connecting from Kabul for this conversation. This is a pivotal time for Afghanistan as the peace process with the Taliban is gaining momentum. After a year and half of talks between the United States negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the Taliban, a framework agreement was reached in February of this year. There is a prospect that the Taliban will start negotiations with the Afghan government after the religious holiday of Eid al-Adha. Is this a correct summary of where things stand?

Omar Sharifi: Yes and no. Yes, there was a peace negotiation between the United States and the Taliban movement and the Pakistanis. The agreement called for a prisoner exchange that is almost complete, except there are 400 prisoners that the Afghan government did not want to release initially because they were involved in mass murder attacks, mass terror attacks. However, after the Loya Jirga (national assembly) decision on August 8th, even these prisoners will be released.  The expectation is that there will be an intra-Afghan talk after the end of the Eid holiday. Technically, maybe in a couple of weeks, we will have some conversation between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Now what does this really mean? 

When the peace process was signed last February, there was an expectation that violence would decrease. Overall, I can say that there has been a slight decrease in spectacular attacks by the Taliban on major cities and on civilian or military targets. However, in the provinces, where there's less international presence and less Afghan media, the war continues. The Taliban attacks in these other parts of the country did not cease - many civilians continue to be victims of an ongoing conflict.

We hear descriptions of the Taliban, from the United States and the international community, as a cohesive group with a unified command and control organization and discernible leadership. The reality is quite different in Afghanistan. Here, we understand that when you speak of the Taliban you are not talking about a single entity but rather different militant groups, predominantly trained in Pakistan, which are operating from the border regions of Pakistan or from inside Afghanistan itself. These groups label themselves as part of the Taliban movement and direct their attacks at foreign military and the Kabul government but do not necessarily have the same agenda when it comes to negotiating a peace settlement or abiding by any future agreements.

For the Taliban, when there are attacks around the country and the government retaliates, this continuation of the war is a way to ensure the cohesion of their movement. It is significant to note that the Taliban are connected to Islamist radical groups throughout South and Central Asia. Even if the talks start, we are not sure what the outcome will be. Many in Afghanistan remember the harsh treatment with the Taliban in control in the 1990s and live today with the realities of their abuses in many parts of the country - they have no trust in the Taliban’s future intentions. We do not see the Taliban as an independent group with enough autonomy to decide about war and peace. Their association with the Haqqani network and its deep ties with the Pakistani security establishment create more questions than answers when it comes to any reliable peace process.

That said, the whole idea of starting a negotiation that could lead to peace is generally welcome among the Afghan population. There are important things that must be taken into consideration. Afghanistan has transformed tremendously in the last 20 years and I’ve lived all my life in this country - I witnessed the civil war against the Taliban through Soviet occupation of the country. Since 2001, we have had millions of girls  go to school and have prospects for meaningful employment, democratic institutions have been established, there is an independent media, and an infrastructure to provide education, health services, and other services for the population.

The overriding question is: what will happen to all of this progress, specifically when it comes to the democratic institutions established in Afghanistan since 2001? These years have significantly transformed the country. The effects have been tremendous in changing lives, in changing perspectives, in changing the understanding of who we are as a people, what we need to protect, and how we have to consider the future. Concepts such as human rights - women rights, are now embedded in our culture, especially coming out of the Soviet invasion and the Taliban rule when human rights or human life meant nothing against ideology. This awareness will not be easily traded for the vague promises any peace agreement could offer.

Any reduction of violence, the brutal violence that was happening in our society for many years, is a welcome gesture. In terms of how the peace talks will happen, we really do not know. We do know that the Taliban have developed ties with Iran and the Russians. They seek money, suppliers and support besides what they receive from the Pakistani intelligence services. There are many stakeholders who have vested interests in how a peace process will play out in Afghanistan. 

VI: The principle stakeholder in Afghanistan, of course, is the United States which has committed blood and treasure in their nearly 20-year effort to define your nation's future. The Trump administration pledged to end the war and withdraw American troops.  The current peace negotiations with the Taliban seem to be fast-tracked so that the Trump reelection campaign can claim this promised achievement. Certainly, both the Taliban and the Afghan government must see this as an artificial timeframe to be manipulated for their own purposes?

Omar Sharifi: If you look at the prospects for a peace agreement with the Taliban from the perspective of American domestic politics it can be seen as a significant achievement, at least on paper. I think both the Afghan people and also the Americans who know Afghanistan - the diplomats, the military, the people who have been involved in rebuilding Afghanistan society for the last 20 years - understand that this peace process  greatly benefited  the Taliban. For the first time, they are internationally recognized as a legitimate entity not just an insurgency bent on overthrowing the government in Kabul. Second, it gave them an opportunity to internally strengthen themselves.

The point is, we think - and by we, I mean Afghans who are involved in day-to-day life here - that the peace process is a way for Taliban leaders to make sure that the Americans leave. They believe that with the departure of the U.S. and international forces from Afghanistan the Afghan government will not receive the level of international support that now keeps them in power. Meanwhile, the Taliban will continue to receive support through their poppy trade, from the backing of Pakistan, and with funds from the Gulf states. 

With this financial and political support, the Taliban can bide their time and eventually take back everything by force. We have experienced that in the1990s when the Mujahideen, which was the precursor of the Taliban, also signed a peace treaty, and then just waited for the government in Kabul to fall. At that time, once the Soviet Union abandoned the Communist government in Kabul, the Taliban just came back and took power and allowed al-Qaeda and other radical groups a safe haven. However, the situation in Afghanistan is quite different than it was at that time. The war with the Soviet Union made the Afghan Communist government very, very unpopular and there was a national opposition to that government. Right now, the Taliban do not enjoy popular support as much as they want to say they do.

The Taliban’s support base is mostly among groups along the border with Pakistan, where Pakistan has developed an infrastructure for training and sustaining these groups for the last 20 years. This current push for a peace process is a major component of the Taliban's plan for military victory. I'm not so sure that the Taliban leadership in Quetta or Peshawar see this as a genuine move towards peace, but rather a way to further isolate the Afghan government. Once international support recedes, they're going to come back militarily and try to control the country again. I'm not sure that is a realistic scenario, because the country has changed so fundamentally. 

VI: Omar, let's look closer at the structure of the Taliban. They reportedly have a military arm and a political arm. The 30 year-old son of the legendary Taliban leader Mullah Omar has recently been put in charge of the militant wing with  attacks escalating in the past months. On the other hand, more senior Taliban leaders have been appointed to the negotiating team. Is this an indication they are more serious about reaching an agreement? Do they all share the same extreme conservative Islamic ideology?

Omar Sharifi: I think it’s a combination of all of it. In order to understand the Taliban leadership, you can look at the Quetta Shura which is the highest Taliban Leadership Council. It's officially the almighty body that controls these different groups. Taliban representatives on Shura committees operate in different parts of the country. The Taliban militias, the armed factions, however, are extremely decentralized and operate independently. They have their own local goals and objectives. Their targets depend a lot on the individual commander and the territory in which they operate. I'm not sure if the Quetta Shura, even when Mullah Omar was alive, supplied their training, weapons, and support. 

I think support, in terms of training and supplies, comes directly through Pakistan intelligence, what we call the Inter-Service Intelligence, the ISI. Then we come to the Taliban allies in the region. When the Taliban were in power, Afghanistan was kind of a mosaic of radical Islamic groups. Fighters from almost every Islamic radical group in the world were in Kabul and dispersed all around the country where they were sheltered by the Taliban.

Most of them were either directly under the umbrella of the Al-Qaeda organization or just operated as allies of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda itself was allied with the Taliban. They were operating in this country serving as guards and the fighters for the Taliban. When the Americans, after 2001, decided to attack the Taliban, the commander of the Taliban forces in the North was from Uzbekistan, and the majority of their forces were from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Gulf States, and Pakistan. In the past these groups constituted a large contingent of the Taliban movement. In addition to training and operational support, I believe they also enhanced Taliban's legitimacy in international radical movements.

We remember that Osama bin Laden himself swore allegiance to the leader of the Taliban. There is an organic relationship between these groups, and specifically all the armed Sunni radical groups that are based in Pakistan and stage attacks both in India and in Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba for example. The Taliban is still collaborating with them. Just last week, we had foreign fighters cross from Pakistan to attack the Afghan government positions along the border. These groups are winning, and I don't believe it will be easy for the Taliban to simply sever all ties with them and say to Al-Qaeda - , okay, bye, we are not going to deal with you anymore and will force you to leave Afghanistan.

When ISIS emerged in Iraq and Syria, many were completely surprised by their brutalities and draconian methods. For us who grew up in Afghanistan and lived under the Taliban government, ISIS tactics - from the destruction of historical monuments, to beheadings, to stoning, to their scorched earth policies, to enslaving of women- was precisely what the Taliban did when they controlled Afghanistan. The only difference was that, in the 1990s, we did not have Facebook or social media to alert the world to the atrocities they perpetrated and the oppression they institutionalized. If you compared ISIS policies with the Taliban regime, you would find that the Taliban provided the textbook that schooled ISIS on how to terrorize a population to get and maintain dominance. 

Today, with the second generation of Taliban fighters, I don't see much change in them and their leadership, especially those based in Pakistan, is collaborating with other international militant groups. I believe that, in the ranks of Afghan fighters, there are a lot of questions about why there needs to be so much international influence. The Afghan-Taliban, I believe, see themselves as having specific national objectives. But the international component of the Taliban group, with their alliances among other Islamist groups that are operating in South Asia, I think that is something that will be very difficult for that component of the Taliban to separate themselves from.

For a militant Islamic group whose ambition is societal control to transform into just a political entity will be a very difficult step to take. It requires a concerted and coordinated effort by the international community, by the Afghan government, by the main backers of the Taliban, specifically the Pakistanis.  In my opinion, the Taliban signed the peace treaty with the United States because they see an opportunity to get rid of the American support for the Afghan government, and then they will continue their military march.

VI: Do you see in Taliban rhetoric any reference to a caliphate? The kind of talk and ambition that attracted many to ISIS? Or is the core of the Taliban focused just on ruling Afghanistan?

Omar Sharifi: I have to make that point clear. There is an important distinction, the Taliban did not announce any ambition to establish a caliphate, what they did announce was an Emirate, which is a kingdom.  According to Sunni jurisprudence, the caliph has to be from a specific tribe, from Mecca, with a relationship with the House of the Prophet. That's why Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created a genealogy to connect with the family of the Prophet. He called himself Syeds - a direct descendant of the prophet. In Afghanistan, for the Taliban, such a caliph is not acceptable, but an emir, in sharia terms, is.

If you look back to the end of World War I, when the Ottoman Empire in modern Turkey collapsed, Turkey and much of the Middle East was occupied by European colonial powers. In 1919, Afghanistan became the only independent Muslim country in the world. Many Muslims were asking the Afghan king of that time, Amanullah, if he would become the caliph, but he could not because he did not have the connection to the family of the prophet.

At the same time, the Taliban did see themselves as a legitimate Islamist government that had a role to play in the larger Muslim world. That is why they recognized the Chechens, they recognized many different Islamist groups around the world and invited them to come to Afghanistan so it would become the base of militant Islamic governance. 

When I was at the university in Kabul, there were a lot of Al Qaeda around. Once in a tea house, I asked them why you are in Afghanistan? I think they were Canadian Arabs - I asked them “Why are you in Afghanistan?”

They gave two reasons. First, Afghanistan is the only Muslim country that's never been directly colonized. Second, there is a saying of the Prophet that the land of the caliphate will emerge from the land which is now modern Afghanistan. They came here because Afghanistan is the only Muslim nation that ever had a successful jihad, both in the 19th century and 20th century. Where all the other Muslim nations failed against European power, Afghanistan did not. They believed that, with a base in Afghanistan, they could rebuild a global Islam, or caliphate. Remember the name “Al-Qaeda” means “the base”.

VI: Afghanistan's two significant neighbors are Pakistan and Iran - Pakistan is Sunni and Iran is a Shia Islamic state. The Taliban are Sunni - how does that dynamic play out?

Omar Sharifi: As I have mentioned, the primary supporter of the Taliban from its inception in 1994 was, of course, the Pakistani government. There is documentation by Afghans scholars and by international researchers that the Taliban survives as a militant group because their bases of operation are outside Afghanistan, in Pakistan. So, a government backed by Sunni clerics provides for a militant Sunni fundamentalist movement, the Taliban, with the proviso that they confine their operation to attacks in Afghanistan.

In the 1990s, Iran was opposed to the Taliban. They supported anti-Taliban forces until George W. Bush announced that Iran was a member of the infamous Axis of Evil. In 2001 the Iranians helped the United States topple the Taliban forces in Western Afghanistan. But after the Axis of Evil and the United States hardline policy toward Iran, more back channels to the Taliban were opened. Iran then sought to use the Taliban as an anti-American group to hurt American targets. 

Therefore, I believe the Iranian relationship with the Taliban today is simply a reply to American pressure. It will remain so until there is a change in American-Iranian tensions. Iran is active in providing the Taliban with supplies, especially in Western Afghanistan. They receive active training and support by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Will it continue in the future if the Taliban becomes dominant once in Afghanistan? I highly doubt it. The Taliban and Al Qaeda represents extremist Sunni, radical Islamists. Iran is a radical Shia Islamist country.

I don't see any organic, meaningful, long term, strategic cooperation between Iran and the Taliban. On the other hand, from a Taliban perspective, Iranian support for them is welcome news. As is Russian support because it has given them more resources to operate in different parts of the country. Otherwise, they would not be able to penetrate Northern Afghanistan or Western Afghanistan as effectively as they are doing today.

For both sides, it's actually a practical move. I believe there is an understanding, but the rhetoric that we are all Muslim brothers - I'm not sure it will sustain itself. 

VI: What exactly is the role of Pakistan? You say the Taliban have always been supported by the Pakistani military. Does the Pakistani civilian government condone this arrangement or are they incapable of interfering? 

Omar Sharifi: There was a lot of discussion over the role of the civilian government of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process. For us, who have been dealing with Pakistan for almost 40 years since the beginning of the Soviet invasion, we know that the armed forces in Pakistan are not just a military entity, they are also an industrial and economic force in Pakistan. They have huge stakes in all facets of governing in this country. From the very beginning of the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 until today, the military have ruled the country for a majority of its history. The officer corps remains extremely influential over civilian rulers. If a prime minister opposes the military they soon find themselves out of office or executed by one means or another. 

I do believe the government of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan can play a positive role in the peace process with the Taliban, but I am not sure they have the means to do it. Since its inception the fundamental concern for Pakistan was its opposition to India. It sees India as a mortal enemy that must be countered. The Pakistani military is exceptionally strong, even possessing a nuclear capability, because of the threats they perceive from India. The military also decided one of the best ways to confront India’s superior economy, superior firepower, superior technology, and larger population, is to engage in unconventional war. The best place to train their unconventional forces and deploy against India, is Afghanistan. In the late 1990s when the Taliban were in power, the majority of attacks that happened in India were perpetrated by Pakistani militants living in Afghanistan. Though they were Pakistani militants, they cooperated with the Taliban, fighting with Taliban forces. In return, the Taliban were helping them in their fight against India.

For the Pakistan military, the Taliban are a strategic asset. It successfully managed to manipulate the international community by playing the double game. They received billions of dollars from the United States to fight the Taliban, but they spent part of that money to support the Taliban and increase their capabilities. Whether Pakistan will change it's policy or not, we just don’t know. 

But there's a new reality emerging in the region. The United States is tired of the war and is going to withdraw from Afghanistan. The major question is, can the Pakistani army sustain the development of a very brutal, radical, Islamist regime next to it? Even if they think they can control a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, what will be the cost? Given specifically that Pakistan is trying to develop close ties with the Chinese.

As part of their Belt and Road Initiative China is investing heavily in Pakistan building infrastructure projects worth $60 billion. There are a number of anti-Chinese Islamist groups who are operating with the Taliban. This will not sit well with the Chinese who will certainly pressure Pakistan to rein in their backing of the Taliban whom they see as a de-stabilizing radical group in South Asia.

VI: I imagine for Pakistan; Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's new virulent anti-Muslim policies underlie their need for military strength to counter India any way they can - even if that means supporting radical groups like the Taliban?

Omar Sharifi:  The Indian government’s anti-Islamic policies have affected Muslim Afghans. There is a lot of discomfort and tension here about why this is happening there because we see India as a democracy, and we are trying to build a democracy where minority rights, the rights of all would be respected. 

The relationship of the Afghan Muslims with the South Asian Muslims is a very interesting story. In the 19th century, the Afghan government officially banned Afghan clerics from studying in Islamic schools in British India on the pain of death. As a Muslim country that had never been directly occupied by a colonial power, Afghanistan retained it's very traditional understanding of Islam, which is very much based on history and culture, rather than ideology.

In the early 20th century, Afghans who went to study in South Asian and post-British Pakistani Islamic institutions, or Madrassas, were ineligible for government jobs because it was preferred to hire those who were trained in Afghan religious schools. In the 1980s, during the Soviet invasion, that dynamic changed with Afghan Muslims for the first time being exposed to South Asian Islamic doctrines. This was a profound experience because, for Afghans, Islam is a faith that defines their whole existence. Afghans think they are probably the best Muslims because they have never been controlled by non-Muslims. While South Asian Islam, in a sense, is more of an ideology that developed within a context of colonial rule.

Afghanistan is an Islamic majority country. Within India, Islam is a minority religion that was repressed during British colonialism. Islam remains the faith in Afghanistan and more of an ideology in the rest of South Asia. That is the difference that is happening that needs to be understood. When Afghans look at what is happening in India, they see it from a political perspective rather than a religious one, because here the understanding is that faith is faith. It's not an ideology based on confrontation or survival. Nobody ever challenged the faith or the security of the believers in Afghanistan. However, in India that challenge has been raised throughout its history. Therefore, attempts to exploit Hindu fundamentalism won’t work here in the larger Afghan context. 

VI: That's an interesting perspective. To look forward to the coming months, if peace negotiations do start between the Taliban and the Afghan government, what do you think they will try to achieve? Are the Taliban looking for a power sharing arrangement? Are they looking to become part of the political process and participate in elections? 

Omar Sharifi: There are a number of possible scenarios. The first scenario could be a Hezbollah type arrangement in which the Taliban, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, control certain territory where the Afghan central government in Kabul will have limited influence.

The second scenario is that the Taliban join the government and become part of the ongoing process of state-building in Afghanistan. Certainly, the presence of Taliban factions will make the Afghan government more conservative, but the democratic process itself would continue.

The third scenario is that the Taliban will join the government as a strong opposition group, thwart any democratic progress, and then work from within to overthrow the government and take over the country once again.

The fourth scenario is that the Taliban moderate their positions and join ordinary Afghan life. Fighters leave their camps and hideouts and come to live among ordinary Afghans. As an example,  a few years ago during the Eid holidays there was a national ceasefire, and a lot of Taliban fighters were allowed to enter cities, and they were surprised to see everyone praying, practicing their Muslim faith as conscientious believers. Some of the Taliban fighters refused to fight anymore because they did not see the point of their cause.

As I have described, there are multiple potential scenarios, but at the end of the day, to be very practical and realistic, much depends on  the Afghan government entering into talks not as an abandoned country, but rather as part of a democratic bloc supported by the international community that reached out and constructively talked with the Taliban.

When the Afghan government talks to the Taliban, to the Pakistanis, and to their international supporters, it is crucial that they are not seen as a government that's about to collapse because the international community doesn’t care about it anymore. If there is a meaningful understanding between the Afghan-elected government, with its international allies, when they sit down with the Taliban and talk, that all sides desire to stop the fighting and actually think about how to end the war and plan for an enduring peace, then there is hope. 

I think we may end up creating a government that might fall under one of the more positive of the four scenarios I mentioned. The Taliban might create a Hezbollah-like arrangement. They might join the government as a strident opposition party, or they could agree to a truly national unity government in which their foreign fighters and the foreign supporters of the Taliban say that, okay, we will not push the Taliban to continue advocating their radical ideology.

More importantly, from my perspective, the rights of women, the human rights of all ordinary Afghans, must be respected. If any peace talks undermine this very significant achievement of fundamental human rights that has taken place in Afghanistan, if that progress is violated, I don't think anything close to peace with the Taliban is possible. I don't believe one peace agreement can deal with all that needs to be resolved. It will be a long process, and it requires a really cohesive understanding between Afghanistan with its allies and the Taliban and its supporters.

VI: Omar, we're coming to the end of our time. This has been an interesting discussion and an optimistic point to end on - that there are prospects of sustainability for the peace process now being undertaken. We can cautiously look forward to a resolution of a war that has taken such a terrible toll on the Afghan people and hope they receive the support and goodwill needed to create the nation they envision and deserve. 

Omar Sharifi: Thank you very much - it has been my pleasure.

Omar Sharifi is Assistant Professor in the American University of Afghanistan, the Senior Research Fellow and Kabul Director of the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies.  He is Asia Society Fellow and member of Afghan 21 Young Leaders Forum. He is graduated from Kabul Medical Institute in 2003. Following his medical studies, he worked as Head of research and publications for the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society in Kabul, and as Director of the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan. From 2006 to 2008, he studied Cultural Anthropology at Columbia University in New York under a Fulbright Fellowship. He also received a fellowship, through the Rumsfeld Foundation at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He completed his PhD in anthropology from Boston University in 2019.