VitaI Interests: Not long ago, the utility of supporting a large and powerful United States Navy capable of engaging in sea battles was under question. Do you see this attitude changing given the current global realities?

James Kraska: It's a complex picture and the answers are not entirely clear. I think the bedrock of Naval power today is ballistic missile submarines and nuclear deterrents, which is the most important element. Aircraft carriers are a Swiss Army knife of the force, and we have the large-deck aircraft carriers as well as expeditionary assault aircraft carriers that often only have helicopters, maybe vertical take-off. We have a lot of them, we have more than the rest of the world combined.

On the other hand, aircraft carriers, although they have a great deal of utility, are particularly vulnerable in a high-end fight. It depends on what type of scenario you're talking about. Overall, I think that we are pivoting greater attention towards sea power because that's where the great power competition plays out. The United States national security strategy talks about the major competitors as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The US still has an advantage in being able to use our projection from the sea in a way that none of those other powers can. Naval power, generally, I think, has greater currency.

It never really should have been a secondary concern but, over the past 15 or 20 years, we were focused on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and counterinsurgency, and there was a sense that sea power was less relevant. Actually, it was only less relevant because you could guarantee or ensure the security of the sea lines of communication because all of the material and the combat power that the United States put into Central Asia and in the Middle East was from ships. Humans would fly in by aircraft but any of the heavy equipment and the rolling stock all went by sea and sea power was taken for granted, but no longer can we take it for granted.

VI: The United States is involved in many regions around the world that warrant a naval presence - South China Sea, Sea of Japan and Taiwan Straits, Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden. How extended is the U.S. Navy these days? Can they accomplish these missions? Or will the strategy consist of  putting ships here and there and hoping for the best in other places?

James Kraska: I think so, I think there are some elements of calculated risk because the needs exceed the force structure that we have in place. If there's not a major event that erupts and you can manage and juggle the resources, then everything is fine. The problem would be if you're confronted with one or more big scenarios at the same time, then I think the United States would be pretty hard-pressed to try and meet all of those missions.

VI: Should the United States engage in partnerships with other countries to share the burden of extended Naval operations? Is partnership a way to augment naval power?

Jame Kraska: Yes, if other countries will contribute. That's always been the question: will anybody else step up to the plate? Seapower is expensive. There's a problem of free-riding on American sea power. This is something that has persisted for decades. It’s not the case just with President Trump. He's addressed it in his fashion, but presidents before him have as well, to limited success, less than  we would like. On the lower-end missions or maritime security operations such as counter-piracy, there was a fairly robust and grand coalition of states that were willing to do that. The problem is to get commitments at the higher end of the spectrum.

Countries, including U.S. allies, are more reticent to seriously commit their limited naval forces. The farther afield it is, say the South China Sea, the more difficult it becomes to try to get commitments from states to have a presence in the region. In that regard, there's been some nominal French and British presence, there's been some Australian presence, as well as Japanese JMSDF presence in the South China Sea.

VI: So is there the worry that allies can't necessarily be counted on?

James Kraska: I am not sure they would put it that way but I don't think that they can be counted on in the way that the United States envisions.

VI: In terms of forecasting American seapower capabilities, should the United States be building ships that can meet the strategic needs of the next 10 to 20 years?

James Kraska: So far nobody else has been able and willing to fill the gaps, like I said. We either build the ship or we scope back on the missions that we're willing to accept. There's a sense, almost a bipartisan stance, of bringing our missions within the resources that we have, an ends and means problem. I think we'll see more of that.

If states are less supportive. I think there's going to be less interest for the United States to become involved. If the states are more supportive, I think that other states, and I think the United States, will continue to be engaged more.

VI: A follow-on question: as the United States builds ships for 21st-century naval engagements and exercises strategic naval power, are the ships being built now or under design like the traditional warships? Or are they next-generation, high-tech vessels that have new and greater capabilities?

James Kraska: I think the problem with shipbuilding is just getting the resources from Congress. There are different platforms out there. It's a joint combined force. It's integrated with outer space initiatives as well. The ships that are now coming out are generally the same ships that we have. The planning to develop a warship is a two or three decade process from the vision all the way to production. The mainstay of the fleet is still the Arleigh Burke destroyer. I think that the gains are more incremental rather than revolutionary. We are testing some things like rail guns, lasers, and advanced weaponry but these are limited testbed types of deployments rather than fleet-wide.

VI: Are current United States’ surface and submarine fleets capable of withstanding, for example, a malicious cyberattack that could render their weapons systems inoperable?

J. Kraska: I just don't know the answer to that and I'm not sure there are many people who do. The United States is probably the world leader in cyber attacks and defense technology. A lot of that knowledge is classified so I just don't know how robust our defenses are compared to other countries. I know that both the United States and its potential adversaries are trying to heavily exploit electronic warfare and cyber warfare lines of attack, but I'm just not sure. I think it's reasonable to surmise that we are as well-positioned as anybody but as an open society we also have some vulnerabilities that authoritarian governments may not have.

VI: Switching to a more specific area - your specialty - the Arctic regions. China and Russia are eagerly exploiting these areas which are newly free of sea ice due to climate change. What will a new, or next-term, president need to do to make sure the United States is not left out of the competition, to have some influence in these regions? Or, to use a naval phrase, has that ship already sailed?

James Kraska: The interesting thing about the Arctic is that it can be viewed as a binary reality between the United States and its friends and allies - either NATO countries like Denmark, Norway, and Canada  or Partnership for Peace nations which are Sweden and Finland, and then on the other side you have Russia. Right now Russia has enormous capability since they also encircle 170° around the North Pole and have legitimate Arctic interests.

As for the US presence in the Artctic, my view is that it's not as capable as it should be. It is  right now principally a Coast Guard mission. The United States Navy has a mission in outer space, and then the Air Force overhead, and the Navy undersea warfare. I think in that regard that the US has as solid a presence as we’ve ever had. The real shortfall in my view is the Coast Guard presence because as the climate changes and the ice melts you have more commercial and civilian uses of the Arctic, and what you really need is a larger constabulary force with search and rescue capability and we don't have that right now.

VI: There are two Coast Guard icebreakers, the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, both commissioned in the 1970s, trying to keep some presence in these regions. There was an initiative under the Obama administration that was carried on by the Trump administration to build a new icebreaker with $750 million that was allocated for its construction. There seems to be some indication that that money is actually now being stripped to go to the border wall. Is that a reality?

James Kraska: I've heard that but I’m not certain. Even so, assuming that this vessel gets built, it's really less than about half of what we need. In order to have an icebreaker on the East and the West ends of the Arctic, in order to have a 1.0 presence with an operational icebreaker on each stationwill require a 2.0 presence.  But there really should be three ships on station - one ship in work up ready to relieve it and another ship that's being repaired from a recent deployment - you really need 3.0 per ocean, Atlantic and Pacific. 3.0 times 2 is 6.0 units of icebreakers to really provide adequate coverage year-round. Russia has several dozen - about three dozen ice breakers of various sizes in contrast. I think we're fairly inadequate in that regard.

VI: Are we depending on some of our partners, like the Scandinavian countries and Canada, to fill in that gap?

James Kraska: I think this is the case in the Arctic because they border on the Arctic Ocean. I think we do leverage our allies more broadly as a force multiplier than we would in a scenario like the South China Sea.

VI: Do you think the United States should be doing more to challenge Russian and Chinese claims?  Are their claims legitimate due to geopolitical realities?

James Kraska: Well, they are geopolitical realities. The claims followed the power of those two great powers - Russia and China. Russia's claims in the Arctic are excessive or illegal, straight baseline claims along the Siberian coastline but they're not as egregious as you might think. They are fairly close to the coastlines. As far as the continental shelf that is the seabed extending out to the North Pole, Russia is following accepted procedures for the condition on the limit for the continental shelf to try to get a final and binding statement of recognition which may allow them to enjoy exclusive use of the  resources of those areas.

In that regard, they're persistent, but they are adhering to the law - the Law of the Sea in particular. China, on the other end, is a serial violator of Law of the Sea Convention. They violate just about every one of the provisions concerning their claims on everything from internal waters to peripheral seas, and they have placed unlawful requirements  on their exclusive economic zone. Then they have a bizarre set of claims concerning the dashed line into the South China Sea which has no relation at all to the Law of the Sea Convention or to international law more broadly.

The Chinese have some perversions of the Law of the Sea such as straight baselines around the islands, as if those islands were an archipelago with internal waters like Indonesia or the Philippines. They have a whole constellation of unlawful claims. In this regard, they're far worse actors than the Russians.

VI: Regarding your statement about the validity of Russia’s claims and any protests to China’s illegitimate ones, are they being examined by a maritime law commission or the International Court of Justice? 

James Kraska: So states are sovereign entities and generally, the default is, not subjected to some kind of international legal process unless they consent. The Law of the Sea Convention overcomes that presumption by having mandatory, compulsory distinct resolutions for mandatory dispute resolution in the Law of the Sea Convention and can be circumvented through a declaration in Article 298 that exempts maritime boundary disputes. To the extent that these unlawful claims interfere with other states that have a maritime boundary dispute, the claimant states then block mandatory or compulsory dispute resolution.

What that means is that there's not really a practical mechanism for adjudicating these different competing claims.

VI: So disputes just hang out there until somebody decides to challenge them in a more direct way? Is that how it happens?

James Kraska: They can be challenged and the purpose of the challenge is to contribute to the formation of customary international law, to ensure that the claims do not evolve into a stronger position through custom and safe practice,  because even though you have the Law of the Sea Convention, it operates in tandem with customary international law. Customary international law is based on safe practice combined with a sense of legal duty or legal obligation. That's really what underpins the United States’ freedom of navigation program.

VI: Given all we've discussed here what would you suggest a future or next term president should prioritize in terms of United States naval power?

J. Kraska: I think that a larger fleet is essential. Continuing to work with and encourage partners and allies to do more is essential. I would also subscribe to the Law of the Sea Convention, which I think is unbalanced in the interest of the United States for a variety of reasons. It also provides legal templates and it makes us more attractive for other states to work with. Countries like Indonesia or Malaysia may be somewhat reluctant. I think they would be reassured by that.

It also is greatly in our interests to develop our own continental shelf because that allows us to have secure legal tenure for whatever claim we make to go to the Commission on the limits of the continental shelf, the same body that Russia has gone to. Russia is availing itself of this mechanism to ensure that it has recognition of its exclusive rights and  the United States is not doing so.

VI: The principal objection of the United States to the Law of the Sea treaty is that it impinges on sovereignty? Is that the argument that has stalled ratification in Congress? 

James Kraska: In the Senate, which renders advice and consent for treaties, there has not been a single, granular objection to it. The treaty has, by an overwhelming vote, been voted out favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee several times. It just never has had a floor vote. My guess is that it would actually probably pass the Senate with the required two-thirds majority. There's a couple of reasons that have been cited for disagreement. Some of them are misinformed in my view.

One is there's just a general disagreement that this convention somehow is a United Nations convention. It has UN in its title and it was the Third UN Conference that negotiated it, sponsored by the General Assembly, but it's not a UN convention and it doesn't create UN bodies. Rather it's an independent international institution that implements the Convention. There's been some talk that the Convention somehow blocks US tax revenue, because the United States would have to pay royalties for the development of this extended continental shelf beyond 200 miles. That's actually not the case.

Although there is a royalty requirement under the International Seabed Authority, the United States would secure legal tenure for an area the size of the state of California for offshore oil and gas and mineral development. I think overall there's a visceral dislike of the Convention by some just because it has UN in the title. It's kind of the greatest shortfall.

VI: Is the US Navy in favor of the Law of the Sea Convention?

James Kraska: Yes. In fact, every chief of naval operations that's alive has testified in favor of the Convention. Every department in the United States government, Department of State, Department of Treasury, Department of the Interior has supported the Convention. In fact, every president has supported the Convention since it was revised and adopted with the new part 11 on seabed mining in 1994.

President Clinton, President Bush, President Obama supported it. We still adhere to it. There's not a clear statement by President Trump. But nonetheless, the United States views the Convention as reflective of customary international law and therefore binding on the United States and all other countries anyway, except for the part 11 portion on seabed mining. The US is operating today as though the Convention were in force except for the obligations it would incur on the seabed mining provisions for the deep seabed.

VI: So the United States is benefiting from being a signatory?

James Kraska: That's right. Even on the deep seabed, the United States had four claims to the deep seabed, each valued at about $250 billion, and because we sat on our hands, we had to give up two of those claims, and therefore half a trillion dollars worth of potential mineral wealth. Meanwhile, countries as diverse as China and India have staked their own claim to the deep seabed and we are therefore missing out on the last land rush on the planet.

VI:  That sounds like ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention should be a priority for the next administration?.

James Kraska: Yes, absolutely. It should be on the treaty priority list. I would say even for this administration it should be a priority because the business and economic benefits through the Convention are so great that I wouldn't necessarily wait. President Trump is not a classic conservative and there might even be some approach from his administration at some point. It just hasn't happened yet.

James Kraska is the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Maritime Law in the Stockton Center for International Law at U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. In 2017 and 2018 he served as a Visiting Professor of Law and John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World Organization at Harvard Law School, where he taught International Law of the Sea.